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1. Economic problems of civil and public liability for contaminated sites 
 
The initiators of environmental pollution have to pay for the avoidance of pollution or the 
restoration (clean up and decontamination) of the damaged areas. The initiator is called 
intruder by way of acting (Handlungsstörer), he initiates or causes danger for the public 
security and order. His retroactive liability is limited to 30 years. Many past cumulative 
damages are not covered by the retroactive liability, because the polluting activities took place 
beyond this period. On the other hand in any case it is always difficult to proof the individual 
causation of contaminated sites (Karl 1993), when many polluters create the damage and the 
contamination cannot be traced to a unique accident (Karl 1987; Franzius 1994). Due to this 
the initiator is not liable by civil law. If the contaminated site bears a risk on public security 
(damage to the groundwater, public health) not only the party who caused the damage is 
liable, but also the actual owner of the site. 
In many cases the public liability has negative side effects and does not collect sufficient 
financial resources for restoration. Under these circumstances compensation mechanisms start 
to work. Several models are described in the following sections. In all these systems, the 
financing is transferred to groups with a supposed connection to the pollution. These groups 
should have more or less a link to the former polluter. They should have closer relationships 
to the purpose of the finances than the community and other parties have. Due to the specific 
economic structures a lot of different models of financing have been developed in several 
Bundesländer. In these models the problem often occurs that non-polluting firms have to pay 
for pollution while enterprises which polluted in the past do not have to pay proportionally to 
their contribution to the damage. Finally some aspects of centralisation and decentralisation of 
steps to finance the redevelopment of contaminated sites are mentioned. 
 
 
2. Costs of redevelopment 
 
The following remarks and tables are to meant to show the reader the problems of the 
quantitative investigation of the costs for the redevelopment of inherited liabilities. These 
problems do not merely arise in determining the future costs, but also in quantifying the costs 
of the past redevelopment.  The research project KOSAL (Systematik zur frühzeitigen 
Ermittlung der Kosten bei der Altlastensanierung) developed a method to determine the costs 





build the cost components in case of redevelopment. The new subdivision divides the costs 
for different part performances (services).  
The following table shows the possible shares of the costs for the different services, but 
unfortunately, no statements about the total costs of special cases are possible:  
  Share of total cost (%) 
  Securing  Decontamination 
Part performances    Off-site  On-site 











Purchased services  4 - 10  4 - 10  5 - 10  5 - 10  5 - 10 
Logging  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Estimation of danger potential  0.1 - 3  0.1 - 3  0.5 - 5  0.5 - 5  0.5 - 5 
Defence of danger (immediately)  0.5 - 2  0.5 - 2  0.5 - 2  0.5 -2  0.5 - 2 
Investigation for redevelopment  3 - 6  3 - 6  3 - 8  3 - 8  3 - 8 
Basic subjects (Kernleistungen)  60 - 70  45 - 65  32 - 50  30 - 50  50 - 60 
Accompanying services  15 - 30  25 - 45  37 - 57  27 - 47  30 - 35 
Planning  5 - 9  5 - 10  5 - 7  3 - 6  5 - 10 
Installation of building site  2 - 10  8 - 14  3 - 6  3 - 5  6 - 8 
Ground moving  1  2 - 5  10 - 15  8 - 12  10 - 15 
Safety measures  5  5  5 - 8  4 - 7  5 - 8 
Water control  -  0 - 20  0 - 3  0 - 3  0 - 3 
Transport  -  -  5 - 30  5 - 25  - 
Storage  1 - 4  4 - 10  0 - 15  0 - 12  - 
Pre-treatment (e.g. sift)  -  -  0 - 5  0 - 4  0 - 3 
Check-up and control  1 - 4  1 - 4  4 - 9  4 - 8  4 - 8 
Public relations work  0.1 - 0.5  0.1 - 0.5  0.1 - 0.5  0.1 - 0.5  0.1 - 0.5 
Compensations      variable     
Post restoration consequences  6 - 10  6 - 10  6 - 10  18 - 30  5 - 12 
Waste product utilisation  -  1 - 3  1 - 5  14 - 22  1 - 8 
Re-assembling in nature  1 - 3  -  5 - 8  5 - 8  4 - 8 
After-care/supervision  5 - 7  5 - 9  -  -  - 
(see: Bracke et al., 1992) 
The expected costs for the estimation of the danger potential depend on the size of the area, 





Costs for the estimation of danger potential 
Old locations  Old waste disposal sites 
Operation area (m
2)  Costs (DM/m
2)  Deposit area (m
2)  Costs (DM/m
2) 
< 5.000  > 15  < 5,000  5 - max. 20 
5.000 - 10.000  10 - 15  5,000 - 50,000  1.50 - 5 
10.000 - 25.000  5 - 10  > 50,000 - 200,000  0.50 - 1.50 
25.000 - 100.000  1.50 - 5  > 200,000  0.30 - 0.50 
> 100.000  0.80 - 1.50     
 
 
The cost margin for different proceeds of decontamination is very wide, because the factors 
influencing the costs are strictly unlike. So, the estimations of the costs should not be 
generalised. The following list provides a summary of the figures by different proceeds. 
 
Proceed of decontamination  Costs 
Thermal techniques  
(Thermische Verfahren) 
150 - 500 DM/t 
Techniques of washing and extraction  
(Wasch- und Extraktionsverfahren) 
200 - 600 DM/t 
Micro-biological techniques  
(Mikrobiologische Verfahren) 
150 - 360 DM/t 
Electrokinetic techniques  
(Elektrokinetische Verfahren):  
100 - 350 DM/t 
Encapsulation (Einkapselung)   
     Insulation of surfaces  
     (Oberflächenabdichtung) 
100 - 300 DM/m
2 
     Sealing-wall  
     (Dichtwand) 
30 - 600 DM/m
2 
     Additional sealing of the basis  
    (Nachträgliche Basisabdichtung) 






The variety of cost factors for the thermal techniques gives an example for the multiple 
influence on the costs:  
 
•  Characteristics of the contaminated ground (e.g. moisture content) 
•  Parameters of the machinery and equipment for the decontamination (e.g. type of the 
system, staff required) 
•  Energy-management (e.g. level of temperature) 
•  Permissions and legal influences (e.g. subjects to approval) 
•  Reduction and elimination of pollutants (e.g. kind and numbers of stages for the cleaning) 
 
 
Besides the different proceeds and their cost factors, the aim of the decontamination is 
important and causes targeted measures. As an example for different levels of aims, the 
objectives of the Bundesland Rhineland-Palatinate is mentioned here (source: ALEX-
Merkblatt-02): 
 
•  Objective 1: The restoration of a state which prevents harmful effects on the environment 
is the aim of objective 1. The state of the environment should not affect the ecosystem. 
This means that materials, which do not naturally exist in the environment, have to be 
eliminated. The loads have to be reduced to the natural regional level. (Nearly 
natural/without disturbance of function/multi-functional utilisation) 
   
•  Objective 2: The restoration of a state that allows the usual utilisation of the environment 
by humans and that initiates neither eco-toxical effects nor serious effects on the 
environment is the aim of objective 2 (sensible utilisation/no dangers for humans; e.g. 
residential areas). The utilisation mostly are subdivided in (SRU, 1995, p. 58): 
•  playgrounds 
•  residential areas 
•  sports fields 
•  parks 
•  industrial and business areas 
•  agricultural acreage 




•  water protection areas 
•  nature reserves 
 
•  Objective 3: The restoration of a state that guarantees that the human health will not be 
endangered, if necessary within the reduction of the possibilities of utilisation (no dangers 
for humans, reductions of utilisation possibilities; e.g. industrial area). 
 
 
Jessberger (1993) estimated the costs for the redevelopment of inherited environmental 
liabilities in Germany in the following manner (Data-basis of the suspected polluted areas is 
the estimation of the Federal Ministry of the Environment (1992): 89,000 suspected polluted 
areas in the Old- and 49,000 in the New Länder): 
He subdivided the areas of inherited environmental liabilities in 3 groups (by size) and 
supposed that 10% of these areas in West-Germany and 30% in the New Länder are really 
inherited environmental liabilities. 
 
Group  1  2  3 
Share  80%  18%  2% 
Volume (m
3)  40,000  200,000  1,000,000 
Size of the area (m
2)  2,000  10,000  50,000 
Radius  25  56  126 
Quantity  18,900  4,250  450 
 
Moreover, he distinguished 3 levels (cases) of redevelopment for all contaminated sites and 







Group  1  2  3  Total 
Case 1  100% decontamination (450 DM/m
3)   
  340,000 Mio. DM  383,000 Mio. DM  202,000 Mio. DM  925,000 Mio. DM 
Case 2 
 
20% special decontamination (750 DM/m
3) 





113,000 Mio. DM 
11,000 Mio. DM 
124,000 Mio. DM 
128,000 Mio. DM 
11,000 Mio. DM 
139,000 Mio. DM 
68,000 Mio. DM 
4,000 Mio. DM 
72,000 Mio. DM 
 
 
335,000 Mio. DM 
Case 3 
 
10% special decontamination (750 DM/m
3) 





57,000 Mio. DM 
12,000 Mio. DM 
69,000 Mio. DM 
64,000 Mio. DM 
12,000 Mio. DM 
76,000 Mio. DM 
34,000 Mio. DM 
5,000 Mio. DM 
39,000 Mio. DM 
 
 
184,000 Mio. DM 
 
If we use the above-mentioned procedure of case 1 for the 258 decontaminations carried out 
in Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW), we get the following results as an estimation for the 
expenditures in the past (31.12.1994):  
 
Group  1  2  3  Total 
Share  80%  18%  2%   
  100% decontamination (450 DM/m
3)   
Quantity  206  47  5  258 
Volume (m
3)  40,000  200,000  1,000,000   





3.  Regional financing models practised in Germany  
 
3.1. The Old Länder 
 
Two financing mechanisms are practised: On one hand the industry and the Länder co-operate 
and the financing of the restoration is the result of the bargaining process between the co-
operating partners (for example in Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate). Other models operate 
with an additional charge on the industrial hazardous waste or other tax mechanism. The 
charge increases the production costs. 
The following presentation provides an overview and is based on two reports of the German 
Council of Environmental Advisers (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen, SRU). 
 
1)  In Northrhine-Westphalia e.g. until 1993 approximately 2,000 measures have been 
supported with about 308 million DM. In principle financing of the redevelopment of 
contaminated sites is based on budgetary means of the Bundesland and on the so 
called licence-model. In this model, licences are required for obtaining the permission 
for hazardous waste treatment. Someone who wants to be employed with special waste 
deposits has to pay for the licence at the `Landesamt für Wasser und Abfall` (county 
state department of water and waste). This charge is mainly used for the financing of 
restoration steps (at least 70 per cent). The revenue from the licences shall reach the 
sum of 50 million DM. In NRW a public-law corporation (Abfallentsorgungs- und 
Altlastensanierungsverband Nordrhein-Westfalen, AAV) is responsible for the 
restoration. This corporation gets its necessary takings from the Land which in turn 
receives the money from the payments for the licences. 
 
2)  Often the restoration is based on the co-operation between enterprises and regional 
administrative bodies. They become partners with equal rights by agreements which 
are legally non-obligatory. The procedure usually starts by the establishment of a 
private-law corporation for restoration. In the following sections, these models are 





-  In the Bundesland Rhineland-Palatinate, the inherited environmental problems are 
primarily determined by a small number of chemical companies. In 1986 the federal 
state government, the regional administration bodies and the industry concluded an 
agreement of co-operation. This agreement included the regulation of restoration. A 
special private-law corporation (called Gesellschaft zur Beseitigung von 
Sonderabfällen (GBS)) was made responsible for the implementation of the restoration 
steps. The company members of the GBS were representatives of the co-operating 
partners. The financing parts of the regional administration bodies are based on the 
'polluter pays principle' as much as possible, one can say that this system is a kind of 
'polluter pays principle in a wider sense'. The remaining costs were been paid at par by 
the Land and the GBS. This adjustment was only used in cases when polluters were 
able to pay parts of the costs. The agreement did not include cases where no initiator 
of pollution could be made liable. Within four years, a financing-size of 50 million 
DM was reached, in which the industry procured its share of 6.25 million DM by an 
extra charge on the taxes on special waste. It must be appreciated that the group which 
had to take the burden of costs had got an obvious connection to the pollution. 
Additionally, there are incentives to avoid special waste. But the implementation of 
the co-operation was not extended. The industry cancelled the agreement (1993) 
because the federal state government intended to include cases where no initiator of 
pollution could be made liable (see SRU 1995, p. 90). It is not possible to transfer this 
model to the other Länder, because the conditions for co-operation are particularly 
convenient in Rhineland-Palatinate. The number of enterprises who have to take part 
in the negotiations is relatively small. In 1993 the `Sonderabfall-management GmbH 
Rheinland-Pfalz` (SAM) was founded as a coordinative instance for hazardous wastes. 
This enterprise has got an option to adopt the complex of redevelopment of inherited 
liabilities but there is no financing model existing so far (see Bettmann 1995, pp. 9f.). 
-    A similar model was practised in the Bundesland Bavaria, but here the municipal fa-
cilities do not take part in the co-operation. An agreement between the industry and 
the federal state government creates a private-law corporation (Gesellschaft zur 
Altlastensanierung in Bayern, GAB, 01.01.1989) and a finance model for the next 10 
years. The financial participation of the firms depends on a contribution rate which is 
connected with the costs for the hazardous waste disposal of the enterprises. The 
yearly share of each enterprise is 10% of the due for hazardous waste, but in maximum 




in maximum 50,000 DM. The minimum contribution is 500 DM/p.a. (see Bettmann 
1995, p. 6). The financial volume for the Land and the industry is 3 million DM per 
year for each party. Thus, the fund at disposal for the measures of restoration in 
Bavaria is 60 million DM. 
 
3)     The system of the Bundesland Hesse is simi lar to the Bavarian concept. In 1989 the 
duties according to the inherited liabilities have been transferred to the corporation 
`Hessische Industriemüll GmbH` (HIM) as a co-operation-project between the Land 
and the enterprises with a financial volume of 50 million DM for the first three years. 
The shares in contribution were divided at par for the Land and the enterprises. The 
industrial part was financed by an additional charge on the disposal of hazardous 
wastes. In addition to this, a fund for municipally caused inherited liabilities was 
established, paid at par by the Land and the municipals. This fund also had a volume 
of 50 million DM for the first three years. The financial resources were raised by a 
contribution to finance inherited liabilities which had to be paid by the producers of 
wastes. Later, the co -operation agreement in Hesse was given up, and the federal state 
government established a special tax on hazardous wastes, partly used to finance the 
restoration of inherited liabilities. 10 - 12 million DM of the tax revenue per year are 
used to finance restoration measures. The main part to finance the restorations in 
Hesse now is realised by financial resources of the state government (about 55 million 
per year). 
 
4)   In the Bundesland Lower Saxony the `Niedersächsische Gesellschaft zur Endlagerung 
von Sonderabfall mbH` (NGS) had been established to co -ordinate the redevelopment. 
The state government has introduced taxes on hazardous wastes. The tax revenue is 
predominantly used to avoid contaminated sites so that the redevelopment has to be 
financed by financial resources of the Land. It had been planned to found the 
`Gesellschaft zur Finanzierung der Altlastenbehandlung in Niedersachsen mbH` 
(GFA) to finance the restoration of contaminated sites. The business shares should be 
divided in relation 2:1 for the Land and the industry which should be represented by 
the association `Verein der niedersächsischen Wirtschaft zur Finanzierung der 
Altlastenbehandlung e.V.` (VFA). A financial volume of 9 million DM p.a. had been 
planned. The share of the industry should be financed by membership dues at the 





would have lead to the consequential effects that neither incentives for prevention 
would have been given nor a relation to the initiatorship would have been established. 
Besides, the total sum of 9 million DM appears too insignificant. 
 
A summary of the used financing models in the Old-Länder is shown in the following table: 
Model  Bundesland 
Duties 
Bremen; Berlin; Lower-Saxony; Baden-
Württemberg; Hesse (since 1991); Schleswig-
Holstein  
Licence model  Northrhine-Westphalia 
Co-operation model 
Bavaria; Rhineland-Palatinate (up to 31.12.93); 
Hesse (up to 1991) 
Without model 




3.2. The New Länder  
 
The German environmental law is in force in the New Länder since the German reunion, but 
these Länder have got a special position by an 'exemption clause' (Freistellungsklausel) which 
was granted and fixed in the `Umweltrahmengesetz` of the old DDR, in the 
`Einigungsvertrag` and the `Hemmnisbeseitigungsgesetz' (Gesetz zur Beseitigung von 
Hemmnissen bei der Privatisierung von Unternehmen und zur Förderung von Investitionen 
from the 22.03.1991). This exemption clause includes the possibility for the purchaser of 
plants to get rid of the damages caused before 01.07.1990. If the application for this was made 
before 28.03.1992, the responsible authority could approve the exemption from public-law 
claims. The authority had to decide in special cases and had to consider the interests of the 
purchasers, the general public and environmental protection. This application could have been 
confined to special pollution or special plants. The 'exemption clause' did not prove to be 
successful in practice because the area of application and the instructions for use had been 
restricted too much. The acceleration of investments was not possible. After liberalising some 





On the 22.10.1992 the Federal government and the governments of the Länder agreed to a 
system of financing contaminated sites in the New Länder. The Treuhandanstalt (THA) and 
the Länder divided up the costs of that exemption clause in proportions of 60 (THA) to 40 per 
cent (large projects: 75 to 25). The financing has been limited to 1000 million DM for the first 
10 years. After the disintegration of the THA the debts of this authority were distributed and 
the Bundesländer had to take over parts of this debts. Its debts in the framework of the 
restoration of contaminted sites have not been distributed on the Länder for not burdening 
them a second time for the same problem (see Kühl 1994, pp. 155ff.). This settlement has 
been introduced because the initiators of environmental damages could not be found out to 
take the responsibility and finally the government - as the owner of the productive equipment 
and capital goods - was blamed for the pollution. Purchasers and owners of plants and plots of 
land are promoted economically by the protection against the legal utilisation and the financ-
ing by the community. Between 1990 and 1991 41 million DM for 91 projects had been 
granted for the new Länder by the Ministry for Environmental Affairs (see BMU 1994) and 
between 1991 and 1992 144 million DM had been spent. This agreement has been changed in 
December 1994 to expedite the operating processes. Now the New Länder can carry out 
independently all the redevelopment-projects which have an expenditure less than 1,5 million 
DM. Additionally a fund for cases of hardship (size: 2 million DM) has been established for 
the acquirers of Treuhand-enterprises who agreed to take the cost of redevelopment but where 
the increasing trend of cost was not foreseeable (see Bettmann 1995, pp. 3f.). 
 
Moreover, in the New Länder Thüringen, Brandenburg and Berlin two organisations for the 
financing of restoration have been founded. For Brandenburg and Berlin the 
`Sonderabfallgesellschaft Brandenburg/Berlin mbH` (SBB) was established in Nov. 1994 to 
organise the disposal of problematic waste. Referring to inherited environmental liabilities it 
has got only the function of an organiser, not of a promoting company. 
In Thüringen the `Thüringer Sonderabfallgesellschaft mbH` (TSA) was founded in 1993 as a 
promoting company to redevelop inherited liabilities and to organise the disposal of 
problematic waste. The financial basis is the agreement of Federal Government and the 






Overview: Inherited environmental liabilities; financing and organisation (see: Bettmann 1995, pp. 5 and 19): 
State  Company  Founded 
 
Tax on waste (yes/no), predicted 
income/year  
(in million DM) 
Budgetary means of 
the Bundesland 
(in million DM) 
Baden-Württemberg  ---  ---  yes 
30  - 40, only a small part for 
contaminated sites 
85 - 100 
Bavaria  Gesellschaft zur Altlastensanierung in Bayern mbH (GAB)  1989  no   
Berlin  Sonderabfallgesellschaft Brandenburg/Berlin mbH (SBB)  1994  no  80 - 100 (AFL)1 
Brandenburg  Sonderabfallgesellschaft Brandenburg/Berlin mbH (SBB)  1994  no  45 - 50 
Bremen  ---  ---  yes 
8 - 10 
 
Hamburg  ---  ---  no  50 
Hesse  Gesellschaft Hessische Industriemüll GmbH (HIM)   19892  yes 
50, only 10  - 12 for contaminated 
sites 
50 - 60 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  ---  ---  no  (AFL) 
Lower-Saxony  Niedersächsische Gesellschaft zur Endlagerung von Sonderabfall mbH 
(NGS) 
1985  yes 
50 
 
Northrhine-Westphalia  Abfallentsorgungs- und Altlastensanierungsverband Nordrhein-
Westfalen (AAV) 
1988  licence 
50, at least 50% for contaminated 
sites 
30 - 40 
Rhineland-Palatinate  Gesellschaft zur Beseitigung von Sonderabfällen in Rheinland-Pfalz 
mbH (GBS) 
1978  no   
  Sonderabfallmanagement GmbH Rheinland-Pfalz (SAM)  1993     
Saarland   ---  ---  no  0,1 
Sachsen  ---  ---  no  (AFL) 
                                                   
1AFL: According to the Agreement between the Federal government and the Länder governments. 




Sachsen-Anhalt  ---  ---  no  (AFL) 
Schleswig-Holstein  ---  ---  yes 
50 
--- 





4.  Regional and environmental economic aspects of financing 
 
4.1. Regional allocation of responsibilities 
 
In addition to the choice of environmental policy instrument, a regulatory authority must be 
selected. The normative economic theory of environmenal regulation approves the principles of 
fiscal and territorial equivalence (Cropper, Oates 1992; Oates, Schwab, 1988; Tiebout, 1956; 
Tullock, 1969; Buchanan, 1965). Due to this contaminted sites there are primarily local and 
regional problems. The local and regional communities are suffering public bads caused by 
contaminated sites and they get the benefits  of restoration. In contrast to central solutions 
decentralised restoration policy makes it easier to 
 
•  install the `polluter pays principle`, 
•  identify local and regional preferences for restoration in accordance to following use of the 
restorated sites,  
•  reflect different restoration costs among the jurisdictions,  
•  test different methods of technical restoration, and 
•  make a wide range of experiences with different instruments of environmental policy. 
 
They are more flexible to handle and can be individually adjusted on the special conditions in each 
region. On the other hand central solutions are inappropriate, because they reduce the opportunities 
of local and regional communities to realise restoration levels which depend on their willingness to 
pay and they need considerable administrative efforts. The main advantage of central regulatory 
authorities is its ability to collect sufficient financial resources. In general the `Old Länder` are able 
to finance the restoration costs and therefore is no need for central financial activities. But if local 
and regional jurisdictions like the `New Länder` are not able to finance restoration costs transfer 
payments (Finanzausgleichszahlungen) are necessary and they should be collected from central 
authorities (Musgrave 1978, p. 146). Irrespective of the central financing the implementation of 





4.2. Financing instruments 
 
Discussing financing systems for compensation and restoration of damages we have to reflect the 
interest in: 
•  fairness, 
•  financing mechanism which are efficient in a way that they prevent future contamination, 
•  sufficient financial resources for restoration. 
In general target conflicts between these interests exist. Fairness means that the polluter which 
caused the damage has to pay for the restoration. On the background of different reasons (unclear 
causation etc.) the restoration of contaminated sites are also financed by parties which are not 
individual or civil liable. This causes conflicts with fairness principles and a better alternative might 
be the financing of restoration costs by the local and regional jurisdiction. The major disadvantage 
of such a solution is low efficiency incentives to prevent future soil contaminations. Taxes on 
objectives which are responsible for site contaminations, for example emissions, specific inputs etc. 
create incentives to prevent future contamination. These instruments are efficient, but if the industry 
decreases the use of charged inputs the tax  volume for compensation might be too low. Therefore, 
additional financial resources by the local and region government are necessary.  
 
In contrast to the US-Superfund the German Länder have not established charges on products and 
liability insurances: 
•  Under competition the output charge initiates an increase of the product prices and a decrease of 
the production. Who bears the financial burden depends on the price elasticity of the demand and 
supply. Is the demand price elasticity high (low) and the supply price elasticity low (high) the 
main fraction of the tax are born by the producer (consumer) (see Probst et al. pp. 80f.). The 
effect of product charges depends on the opportunities of the firms to increase the product prices. 
If the market demand on the product market pays the bill and if the product prices increase, the 
demand will certainly decrease in the long run. If the firm has no substitution opportunities the 
effects of a product charge and an input charge are the same. If the firm has substitution 
opportunities the decrease of the production is lower in the case of an input tax than in the case 
of an output charge. If the externalities and damages depend more on specific inputs than on the 
output level, input charges increase the internalisation effects, because they have specific 
incentives for input substitution. Both instruments (product and input charges) are not kind of 
optimal (in terms of prevention incentives) mechanism to allocate financial responsibilities for 





fact, that the current level of waste or the current level of production do not correspond with the 
individual contribution to the contamination. Additional charges on products and inputs can only 
be installed efficiently on the federal state level. Opportunities for decentral solutions of the 
contaminated site lead a reduction of these problems. 
•  Charges for liability insurances will increase the insurance price and the price for financial 
resources. On the one hand this finance systems might be sufficient to collect money for the 
restoration of contaminated sites. On the other hand they do not have prevention effects and the 
financial contribution to the fund for redevelopment does not correspond with the causation of 
the damage. Moreover, insurances are not the polluting products which have to be restricted. 
Insurance taxes - like any new tax - increase administrative and compliance costs (see Probst et 
al. 1995, p. 87). It is difficult to estimate the effects on the insurance premia, but empirical 
studies for the USA (Superfund) indicate an increase of the insurance premia (property and 
casualty insurance) of 0.2 to 0.4 percent (see Probst et al. 1995, p. 85). 
 
In partial accordance with the Superfund solution the German Länder work with cooperation 
models and input taxes (Oates 1994, p. 118). Decental solutions are able to reduce transaction costs 
and give the chance to use methods closely related to the `polluter pays principle`. The inclusion of 
the firms in such an agreement has lower transaction costs because of the small number of co-
operating participants and better opportunities to control free riders. As we have seen, the co-
operation model practised in Rhineland-Palatinate could not be transferred e.g. to the conditions of 
Northrhine-Westphalia, the implementation of such a system seems impossible due to the great 
number of concerned enterprises. Co-operation models are used in the Länder where the number of 
affected enterprises is  low and a local concentration of the firms can be found. In general, co-
operation is advantageous for both sides:  
•  The public acceptance of the industry is growing. 
•  The enterprises have the advantage that the federal state puts aside legislative initiatives whose 
realisation could be more expensive or more restrictive than the assertion of existing regulations. 
This procedure can avoid innovative adjustments. The firms `calculability' of the costs increases 
and they are involved in the co-ordination of the steps of restorations.  
•  The economic attractive use of sites are not longer blocked by contamination and local 





Altogether, the co-operation models with a small number of co -operating participants are said to be 
a flexible financial instrument to solve problems of restoration. While considering the advantages of 
these models, the search for the initiators of environmental damages and the use of the polluter pays 
principle must not be neglected, because these concepts are superior in the economic view. 
 
As an element of co-operation modells we have identified different types of fees and taxes. The 
government in Northrine Westfalia pursues three aims with the licence model: First, it should have 
the character of a charge for use, because the licence-taker pays for the advantages of the licence. 
Second, it should act as an incentive for preventing environmental damages and finally, it should 
collect sufficient financial resources for restoration.  
•  The first aim cannot be achieved because of the structure of the market. The licence-taker has got 
incentives to pass the costs of the licences to the producers of the waste, because the structure of 
the market tends to be monopolistic and the elasticity of the demand is low. The waste producers 
do not have - in the short run - the possibilities to dispose from refuse and sewage by themselves. 
This market will become a field with no or low competition (see Karl 1987, p. 53).  
•  In this model the incentives for prevention are affecting the waste producers, because the costs of 
waste disposal increase as the charge will be passed to them. The waste producer wants to reduce 
his financial burden and compares the costs of avoidance with the costs of the waste disposal. 
However, in the case of NRW, this model apparently has not achieved significant incentives for 
avoidance (see SRU 1990, Tz. 760; Karl 1988, pp. 357ff.), so that the adjustment regulates the 
activities of waste disposal, but does not limit activities of emissions.  
•  The licence does not correspond with the expected future damages or with the contribution to the 
past damages. Not all present-day producers of waste have caused environmental damages in the 
past, but all of them have to pay for the restoration. Therefore, not prevention, but financial 
interest determines the licence system.  
 
Input charges are an alternative to the licence modell. The effects of input charges depend on the 
product market situation if firms are able to increase prices in proportion to the input charge. Only 
under the unrealistic situation that the product demand does not react - neither in the short nor in the 
long run  - the input charge would have no effect on the future environmental damages. In more 
realistic situations the output price increase reduces the production and the input volume. Higher 
prices induce a decrease of demand with the strength of this effect depending on the price elasticity 
of demand (e.g. substitution opportunities for the demand). Shrinking profit reduces the attraction of 





Probst et al., pp. 75ff.). The profit decrease induces the search for opportunities to substitute the 
critical inputs. The substitution process increases the prevention if the environmental risk depends 
on the input factor. If the critical inputs of each firm are the object of the charge the firms contribute 
financial resources in dependence of their contribution to the damage. 
For the New Länder, financing by the `common charge principle` (Gemeinlastprinzip) is 
reasonable. From the allocative point of view, the `polluter pays principle` is superior to other 
mechanisms of financing for the redevelopment but this principle cannot be used in situations in 
which no initiator can be found out like in the New Länder. Burdening new owners - who did not 
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